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The First Amendment in the Foreign
Affairs Realm: ""Domesticating" the
Restrictions on Citizen Participation
by BRAD R. ROTH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts, constitutional scholars, and ordinary citizens of the United
States have long recognized the crucial role of free speech and free access
to information in a democratic polity. Without an airing of the widest
range of views and information, governmental actions are shielded from
proper review and evaluation, resulting in the concentration of political
power in the hands of dictatorial authorities. A democracy requires that
decisionmaking power be widely dispersed, with citizens free to evaluate
independently the issues of the day, to associate with like-minded per-
sons, and to take appropriate action. Such action may involve organizing
to defeat elected officials whose decisions do not embody the citizens'
values or ideas, or it may extend to participation in public affairs outside
the realm of the electoral process, in voluntary projects that bring to
bear, in former President Bush's expression, "a -thousand points of
light."'
Yet this seemingly uncontroversial proposition remains open to re-
markable challenges when the issues involved relate to foreign affairs. In
this field, the constitutional lines are poorly demarcated, and the reach of
restrictive legislation unclear. The unabashedly repressive legislative
mindsets of past eras, which brought us such statutory schemes as the
Alien and Sedition Acts2 of the 1790s and the Subversive Activities Con-
trol Act3 of the 1950s, have left a residue that poses a continuing danger
* Doctoral student, Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, Boalt Hall School of Law,
University of California at Berkeley. B.A. 1984, Swarthmore College; J.D. 1987, Harvard
University; LL.M. 1992, Columbia University. The author would like to thank Lori Fisler
Damrosch and David D. Caron for their helpful commentary.
1. George Bush, Stakes are High and Choice is Crucial, Address Before the 1988 Repub-
lican National Convention (August 18, 1988), in L.A. TIMES, August 19, 1988, § 1, at 6.
2. Four separate statutes comprised the Alien and Sedition Acts. One is still in force
today, but applies only in time of war: the Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798)
(current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-23 (1988)). The remaining three have either been repealed,
the Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798) (repealed 1802), or have expired. The Sedi-
tion Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801); the Alien Act (or Alien Friend Act), ch. 58,
1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired June 25, 1800).
3. 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98 (1988).
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to constitutional liberty, and thus to democratic control over decisions of
life-and-death consequence for Americans and for the world at large.
The assertion that free speech and association must give way in the
field of foreign affairs has been made with astounding brazenness. Illus-
trative is the following colloquy between the Government and the bench
during the argument held before the United States Supreme Court in the
1981 passport revocation case of Haig v. Agee:4
QUESTION: General McCree, supposing a person right
now were to apply for a passport to go to [El] Salvador, and
when asked the purpose of his journey, to say, to denounce the
United States policy in [El] Salvador in supporting the junta.
And the Secretary of State says, I just will not issue a passport
for that purpose. Do you think that he can consistently do that
in light of our previous cases?
MR. McCREE: I would say, yes, he can. Because we
have to vest these- The President of the United States and the
Secretary of State working under him are charged with con-
ducting the foreign policy of the Nation, and the freedom of
speech that we enjoy domestically may be different from that
that we can exercise in this context.5
As highlighted in Justice Brennan's dissent, such restriction of constitu-
tional liberty in the foreign affairs arena is precisely the implication of the
Court's decision in Haig v. Agee.6 Although in 1991 Congress, seeking to
counteract that implication, specifically barred the Executive from revok-
ing passports on the basis of mere speech uttered abroad,7 disparagement
of First Amendment rights remains an enduring feature of foreign affairs
law.
The idea that constitutional liberty is a lesser value where foreign
affairs issues are involved is mistaken and pernicious. As Justice Black
made clear in his famous Pentagon Papers' concurrence, the democratic
function of First Amendment freedoms (in that case, freedom of the
press) is all the more pronounced in foreign affairs:
Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose decep-
tion in government. And paramount among the responsibilities
of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government
4. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
5. Id at 319 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting transcript of January
24, 1981 oral argument, at 20).
6. Id.
7. 22 U.S.C. § 2721 (1992). See H.R. REP. No. 53, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1991) and
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 138, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.S.C.A.N.
384, 401-02 (citing Agee in explaining the need for "clarification" of the authority delegated to
the Executive).
8. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands
to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell .... In re-
vealing the workings of the government that led to the Vietnam
war, the newspapers nobly did precisely that which the Foun-
ders hoped and trusted they would do.9
The substance of Justice Black's point is not limited to freedom of
the press. The thousands of North American visitors to Central America
during the 1980s, who returned to hold meetings illuminating the nature
and consequences of the U.S. policies in the region, fulfilled the same
informative function as the publishers of the Pentagon Papers. Indeed,
these persons consistently disseminated information beyond and at vari-
ance with that available from the mainstream press, which gave the is-
sues less thorough attention and which drew heavily on official sources.
Moreover, the familiar notion that the nation "speaks with one
voice" in foreign affairs, a notion that figures so prominently in the re-
strictive view of foreign affairs liberties,"0 invokes a state-centered view of
international interaction that can only be described as archaic. In the
modern era, U.S. citizens are also citizens of the world; their participa-
tion in issues and events abroad have long since ceased to be necessarily
mediated through the vehicle of their government. Individually and as
members of non-governmental organizations (NGO's), citizens provide
money, labor, and know-how to address human needs abroad, investigate
and denounce human rights violations, and help to mediate conflicts-all
without the U.S. Government's involvement, and often to its consterna-
tion. A country claiming to be the world's leading democracy can
scarcely argue that constitutionally-protected participatory liberties end
at the national border, or apply only to discourse with fellow U.S.
citizens.
It is thus imperative to expose and rein in the statutory and regula-
tory schemes that may risk limiting or chilling First Amendment free-
doms in the foreign affairs realm. These inhibitory laws can be
eradicated or "domesticated" by bringing the relevant standards of con-
stitutional scrutiny into line with the standards applied to statutes and
regulations of purely domestic concern. Such "domestication" of speech-
related foreign affairs regulations can be accomplished without compro-
mising either national security or the Government's ability to administer
its foreign policy, though not without requiring the Government to toler-
ate gadflies. Unless the foreign affairs activities that can be regulated or
9. I. at 717.
10. See Detley F. Vagts, The Logan Act: Paper Tiger or Sleeping Giant?, 60 AM. J. INT'L
L. 268, 269 (1966). See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (discussing partic-
ipation of state governments in foreign affairs); 106 CONG. REC. 8625 (1960) (Senator Ful-
bright's comments regarding the Logan Act and individuals' participation in foreign affairs).
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prohibited are clearly and decisively limited to those analogous to regul-
able or prohibitable activities in the domestic realm, citizens will be de-
nied the participatory rights that lie at the core of First Amendment
jurisprudence.
II. ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM: LAWS RESTRICTIVE OF EXPRESSION
AND ASSOCIATION IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS REALM
A. The Foreign Agents Registration Act
In May 1990, a group called the National Agenda for Peace in El
Salvador (National Agenda) placed an advertisement in the Washington
Post, featuring "An Open Letter on El Salvador to President Bush and
the Congress," signed by the Archbishop of Seattle, the former Governor
of New Mexico, two-time Presidential candidate Rev. Jesse Jackson, civil
rights leader Coretta Scott King, and some two dozen other prominent
persons, mostly clergy."l The letter called "on the Administration and
the Congress to support a political solution to the conflict in El Salvador,
by conveying as strongly as possible the U.S. desire that all parties, in-
cluding the Salvadoran military, bargain in good faith." 2 It further
cited a finding by a Congressional task force that insufficient progress
had been made in the investigation of the murders of six Jesuit priests in
El Salvador, and urged the suspension of "the U.S. aid which fuels the
war in El Salvador."
1 3
Soon afterward, the National Agenda received a communication
from the Department of Justice, which stated that the advertisement "in-
dicates that you are engaged in publicity activities on behalf of the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)," the Salvadoran
guerrilla organization.14 The letter also stated that the National Agenda,
because of its advertisement, "may have incurred an obligation to regis-
ter pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (FARA) as
amended, 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq."15 The letter from the Justice Depart-
ment demanded "a description of the nature of your activities for or in
the interest of the FMLN" and queried "whether your activities are di-
rected, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in part by a foreign
government, foreign political party or foreign organization."'
16
The Justice Department inquiry into the National Agenda might
11. WASHINGTON POST, May 15, 1990, at A20.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Undated letter from Joseph E. Clarkson, Chief, Registration Unit, Internal Security
Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, to the National Agenda for




easily be dismissed as an example of overreaching by an overzealous offi-
cial who misunderstood the applicable law. After all, as two House sub-
committee chairs pointed out in their joint protest to the Attorney
General, "There is nothing in the ad to indicate that the group is engaged
in activities on behalf of any foreign principal."' 7 Yet this incident was
not an anomaly; it arose as a natural consequence of FARA's breadth.
The wording of the statute invites intrusive inquiries into the precise con-
tent of dialogue between U.S. citizens and representatives of foreign orga-
nizations, and risks branding as "foreign agents" citizens whose opinions
on foreign affairs place them in sympathy with the goals of foreign
organizations.
Under FARA, an "agent of a foreign principal" includes:
any person who acts as an agent, representative, employee, or
servant, or any person who acts in any other capacity at the
order, request, or under the direction or control of a foreign
principal or of [a foreign principal's agent] and who directly or
through any other person -
(i) engages within the United States in political activities
for or in the interests of such foreign principal .... .
The term "political activities" is broadly defined. 9 Unless construed as
surplusage, the words "in the interests of' mean something distinct from
and broader than "for" (or "on behalf of"). 20 Although the legislative
history establishes that this clause ought not to be interpreted to include
circumstances involving an incidental confluence of interests, 2' the exist-
ence of a "request" may tend to negate any presumption that the conflu-
ence was incidental.22
17. July 10, 1990 letter from U.S. Representative Robert W. Kastenmaier and U.S. Rep-
resentative Don Edwards to Attorney General Richard L. Thornburgh, at 1. The Congress-
men wrote as chairmen of the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the
Administration of Justice, and the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights,
respectively (copy on file with the Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review).
18. 22 U.S.C. § 61 l(c)(l) (1988) (emphasis added).
19. The term "political activities" includes any activity that might persuade any section
of the public regarding U.S. foreign policy issues or the policies of a foreign entity. See 22
U.S.C. § 611(o) (1988).
20. Statutory interpretation doctrine includes a presumption against construing addi-
tional words as surplusage. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) ("Ca-
nons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate
meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise .... ").
21. The Act is not intended to cover "persons who are not, in fact, agents of foreign
principals but whose acts may incidentally be of benefit to foreign interests ...." H.R. REP.
No. 1470, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2397, 2401.
22. For example, active opposition to the Gulf War could scarcely have been construed,
without more, as political activity "in the interests of" Saddam Hussein's regime, even though
such opposition would have served the interests of the Iraqi government. If the Iraqis had
"requested" an individual or organization to take action in opposition to the war, however, "in
the interests of" seems sufficiently broad to sweep in any action taken pursuant to the request,
Spring 1993] THE FIRST AMENDMENT
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The central problem in the interpretation of FARA is the term "re-
quest." This term's definition was the subject of a pivotal Second Circuit
decision in Attorney General of the United States v. Irish Northern Aid
Committee ("INA C'). 23 INAC involved a voluntary association active in
collecting money and material aid for the Republican cause in Northern
Ireland. 24 The Attorney General brought suit to compel INAC to regis-
ter as an agent of the Irish Republican Army, Provisional Wing (IRA)
and to comply with the highly detailed demands for information specified
by FARA.25 INAC denied that it was an agent of the IRA, contending
that its activities constituted "a citizen's constitutionally protected ex-
pression of political beliefs and sympathies. ' 26 INAC further asserted,
consistent with the 1946 Third Circuit decision in United States v. Ger-
man-American Vocational League," that an "agent" must be defined in
accordance with Section 1 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which
requires that the agent be subject to the principal's "control.- 28 The dis-
trict court disagreed, stressing the disjunctive "or" in the wording of the
statute, and held that "it is sufficient to establish agency under the Act
that defendant is a 'representative' of the IRA, or acts at its 'request.' ",29
The court went on to hold, on the basis of a large number of exhibits,
that the requisite relationship was "unequivocally establish[ed]."'
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's opinion, but added
what it termed "a note of caution" regarding the term "request., 3 The
court agreed with the holding below that "control" was not a require-
ment of agency under FARA, since the "concern [was] not whether the
agent can impose liability upon his principal but whether the relationship
warrant[ed] registration by the agent to carry out the informative purposes
of the Act."'3 2 Yet the court recognized that if "request" was "to be un-
derstood in its most precatory sense," enforcement of the Act would ex-
tend to "conduct that Congress did not intend to regulate"-that is,
conduct only incidentally beneficial to foreign interests. 33 Having ac-
ceded to the rejection of the most obviously workable standard, the court
whereas "for" or "on behalf of" would have seemed to interpose an additional requirement
that the action have been taken solely for the regime's benefit.
23. 668 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam), affig 530 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
24. 530 F. Supp. at 245.
25. Id. at 246-48 (referring to 22 U.S.C. § 612(a), which denotes required contents of
registration statement).
26. INAC, 530 F. Supp. at 251.
27. 153 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 833 (1946).
28. INAC, 530 F. Supp. at 256.
29. Id. at 257.
30. Id.
31. INAC, 668 F.2d at 160-61.
32. Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
33. Id. & n.5.
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embarked on what amounted to an effort to keep Pandora's Box half-
closed.
The court's failure to develop a convincing alternative standard was
foreordained because the task the court defined for itself was beset with
contradiction. If FARA's definition of an "agent" is at variance with the
common-law and commonsense definition of the term, the result is dis-
informative. As Justice Black explained, FARA "is intended to label
information of foreign origin so that hearers and readers may not be
deceived by the belief that the information comes from a disinterested
source."34 In other words, the listener is entitled to know whether the
speaker is speaking in his own voice as an opinionated American citizen,
or whether he is speaking as the obligor of a foreign entity, and thus
indifferent to the actual merits of his statements. By dubbing the speaker
an "agent" even though he has not subjected himself to foreign control,
the enforcer of the Act defames the exercise of constitutionally-protected
expression.
The point is clearer if one recognizes that the Act's purpose, at least
as originally conceived, was not merely to identify but to denounce.35
The House Judiciary Committee proposed the legislation in 1937 in re-
sponse to evidence purporting to show that foreign agencies were "violat-
ing both the letter and the spirit of international law" by supplying
"funds and other materials to foster un-American activities, and to influ-
ence the foreign and domestic policies of this country."' 36 The goal was
to compile
information about [the agents'] political propaganda activities,
their employers and the terms of their contracts ... so that the
American people may know those who are engaged in this
country by foreign agencies to spread doctrines alien to our
democratic form of government, or propaganda for the purpose
of influencing American public opinion on a political
question.37
This implies that Congress' intent was to cover improper activities con-
trolled by foreign agencies. It was hoped that the "spotlight of pitiless
publicity [would] serve as a deterrent to the spread of pernicious
propaganda.38
Admittedly, the Act's 1966 amendment 39 expanded FARA's initial
purpose beyond exposure of foreign-sponsored subversion to exposure of
34. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
35. H.R. REP. No. 1381, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937).
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
39. Pub. L. No. 89-486, 80 Stat. 244 (1966).
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lobbying by foreign entities eager to influence U.S. policies to suit their
economic and political interests.4° Yet there is no indication that the
amendment was intended to expand coverage to persons not controlled
by foreign interests; indeed, the legislative history is directly to the con-
trary.4' Moreover, if coverage of the lobbying efforts of allied or neutral
governments and organizations dilutes some of the "subversive" stigma
of the registration requirement, it surely does not eradicate the tinge of
disrepute. As illustrated by Patrick Buchanan's campaign advertise-
ments revealing the registration of key Presidential (Bush) associates, in-
cluding the Republican National Committee Chairman, as agents of
Japanese and Korean entities, registration under FARA may be viewed
as evidence that the registrant is, if not completely unpatriotic, certainly
not to be trusted in matters of public interest.42
Even assuming that some purposes of the statute were served, rather
than subverted, by broadening coverage to those not under the control of
a foreign entity, the Second Circuit's question in INAC of "whether the
relationship warrants registration by the agent to carry out the informa-
tive purposes of the Act"43 does not rise to the level of a test-at least,
not one that would satisfy the constitutional requirement of fair notice as
to the conduct covered." The court presumably recognized this, but
conceded that in its conception, "[t]he exact perimeters of a 'request'
under the Act are difficult to locate."45
According to the court, a "request" falls "somewhere between a
command and a plea," and the surrounding circumstances will indicate
whether registration is required.46 This "totality-of-the-circumstances"
test centers on "whether those requested to act were identified with speci-
ficity by the principal" and on "the specificity of the action requested."47
The court thus distinguished between "members of a large religious, ra-
cial or ethnic group respond[ing] to pleas for contributions or generalized
40. See Note, The Foreign Agents Registration Act: A New Standard for Determining
Agency, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 365, 368 (1983).
41. See H.R. REP. No. 1470, supra note 21, at 2401 (whatever the original intent, it "does
not appear warranted in present circumstances" to extend coverage to "persons who are not,
in fact, agents of foreign principals but whose acts may incidentally be of benefit to foreign
interests").
42. In Meese v. Keene, the Supreme Court was persuaded by expert testimony and a
public opinion survey that the Act's classification of foreign-sponsored advocacy as "political
propaganda" was stigmatizing, and could damage the political fortunes of a public official who
exhibited films so classified. The Court nonetheless upheld the constitutionality of that aspect
of the Act. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 473-74 & nn.7-8 (1987).
43. INAC, 668 F.2d at 161.
44. See Note, supra note 40, at 380 n. 11. See also Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972).




political support" and a "sufficiently limited group of identifiable individ-
uals" who are asked to follow "a particular course of conduct." The
latter circumstances "may show that those 'requested' are in some way
authorized to act for or to represent the foreign principal. ' 48 The uncer-
tainty of this "test" is self-evident.
Unfortunately, the circumstances presented in the INAC case pro-
vide few additional clues to determine whether an organization is acting
as an agent for FARA purposes. The vast array of internal memoranda
quoted by the district court included a range of statements indicating
INAC's support of, and communication with, the IRA leadership.49
Neither court indicated which of the quotations led it to conclude that
INAC operated at the IRA's "request." Most plausibly persuasive was
an INAC official's written statement describing the group as "the only
organization in America authorized by the Republican Movement in Ire-
land to collect money for food, clothing, etc. . . ."0 However, neither
court set this statement apart from any of the more generalized state-
ments of support. In any event, this "authorization" would seem to es-
tablish only that the IRA had vouched to its American supporters for the
trustworthiness of INAC, and that the IRA preferred contributions from
the U.S. to be coordinated through a single source. None of the memo-
randa contained evidence of a stronger connection to the IRA; there was
no indication, for example, that the IRA selected INAC's leaders, or that
INAC's political "line" was set by the IRA without respect to the in-
dependent judgment of INAC leaders or members.51 Under the INAC
ruling, then, any U.S. organization (or individual) supportive of, and
having a working relationship with, a foreign organization is vulnerable
to FARA.
The sweep of "request," as defined in INAC,52 is potentially formi-
dable. Foreign affairs activists are regularly asked by representatives of
foreign governments and political organizations to perform any number
of activities, from arranging a U.S. speaking tour for a foreign politician,
to initiating a petition drive demanding the cessation of a policy or re-
lease of a political prisoner, to bringing a certain fact to the attention of
officials, media, or the public. As a general example, the foreign repre-
48. Id. at 161-62 (emphasis added).
49. INAC, 530 F. Supp. at 257-58.
50. Id. at 258.
51. The latter standard would still be troubling. An American activist whose sympathies
lead her presumptively to follow the line established by a foreign political organization still
speaks in her own voice. So, too, does the joint citizen or resident alien who chooses to be a
member of the foreign political organization, and thus perhaps to subject herself to party disci-
pline, as long as she is under no legal obligation or other compulsion to follow the party's
dictates or to remain with the party.
52. INAC, 668 F.2d at 161.
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sentative may tell the activist, "If you are disposed to help us, the best
way would be for you to do 'X.'" In this situation, "X" may be some-
thing very specific, and may not be the subject of any general "plea," yet
the activist's independence is in no way undermined. The activist's af-
firmative response to requests made personally to her by representatives
of an organization may be based solely on her independent judgment of
what is just and reasonable. (Indeed, she may on this basis comply with
a request even from an organization that she does not particularly sup-
port.) Thus there may be no real inconsistency between a "request," no
matter how specific its subject matter or addressee, and the incidental
confluence of interests that the INAC court conceded to be beyond the
intended scope of FARA.
The greatest danger of FARA is not the likelihood that its substan-
tial criminal penalties" a will actually be applied, or even that many in-
dependent activists or activist groups will actually be compelled to
register as foreign agents.54 Rather, the real danger is that the loose "re-
quest" standard will provide the basis for far-reaching inquiries, backed
by subpoena or civil discovery power, into "relevant" communications
between politically active American citizens and politically active for-
eigners, as well as into ensuing communications taking place exclusively
among American citizens." The result, then, would be to impose one of
the most alarming consequences of FARA-the obligation to divulge de-
tailed information about communications with foreigners-on individu-
als and groups who, upon closer scrutiny, clearly appear to be beyond the
Act's coverage. In addition to interfering with the associational freedom
of Americans, 6 disgorgement of such information could, among other
53. See 22 U.S.C. § 618(a) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 951 (1988).
54. This is so despite the current executive and judicial trends toward more expansive
enforcement. For example, in 1980, Assistant Attorney General Heymann stated that it is
"fair to draw the conclusion that an individual is not acting independently .... but is acting as
an agent or alter ego of the foreign principal," only when "the relationship substantially obli-
gates the agent to the foreign principal." Inquiry into the Matter of Billy Carter and Libya:
Hearings before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Activities of Foreign Governments of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 700-01 (1980) (statement of Phillip B. Heymann,
Assistant Attorney General). In comparison, the more recent positions taken by the Govern-
ment in the INAC and National Agenda incidents would require a number of individuals and
organizations to follow the mandates of FARA, even if they do not appear to be controlled by
a foreign principal. See supra text accompanying notes 14-33. See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 27-32 (judicial definition of what constitutes "agency" for purposes of FARA be-
comes more expansive).
55. Civil discovery yielded the plethora of internal documentation cited by the district
court in INAC. See 530 F. Supp. at 257-58. The Justice Department ultimately relented in the
National Agenda incident related above. See supra text accompanying notes 11-16.
56. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957). Both cases discuss the right to freedom of association as provided under the
U.S. Constitution.
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things, pose serious dangers to foreign political activists operating under
conditions of repression in their own countries, and to American activists
subsequently travelling in such countries. FARA, therefore, has a chil-
ling effect on political participation that potentially goes far beyond the
stigmatization brought on by the Act's application.
B. The Logan Act
The Logan Act of 1799 (Logan Act)5 7 presents a set of problems
closely related to those posed by FARA. The subject matter, however, is
the inverse: whereas FARA is concerned with what foreigners say to
Americans, the Logan Act is concerned with what Americans say to for-
eigners. Moreover, whereas FARA does not purport to bar speech (ex-
cept by those who have breached an obligation to register), the Logan
Act is directly prohibitory. The Logan Act reads as follows:
Any citizen of the United States, wherever he may be,
who, without authority of the United States, directly or indi-
rectly commences or carries on any correspondence or inter-
course with any foreign government or any officer or agent
thereof, with intent to influence the measures or conduct of any
foreign government or of any officer or agent thereof, in rela-
tion to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or
to defeat the measures of the United States, shall be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or
both.
This section shall not abridge the right of a citizen to ap-
ply, himself or his agent, to any foreign government or the
agents thereof for redress of any injury which he may have sus-
tained from such government or any of its agents or subjects.58
In lay parlance, the Logan Act is generally described as a law which
prevents U.S. citizens from negotiating with a foreign government on be-
half of the United States without authorization.59 In actuality, the Act
purports to bar all communication with representatives of a foreign gov-
ernment made "with intent to influence [its] measures or conduct in rela-
tion to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat
the measures of the United States ... ."I The statutory language, inter-
preted broadly, describes almost any conversation a foreign affairs ac-
tivist might be inclined to have with a foreign official.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1988).
58. Id.
59. Hedrick Smith, Administration and Jackson's Trip: Limits of Citizen Diplomacy
Tested, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1984, at A8; Nathan Lewin, Travels with Ramsey, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, June 23, 1980, at 17.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 953 (emphasis added). Note the exemption for citizens applying to for-
eign governments for redress of private injuries. Id.
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In the 194 years that the Logan Act has been on the books, there
have been no convictions, no trials, and just one indictment. 6' Thus, the
statute might appear a dead letter, were it not periodically brandished by
Administrations embarrassed by activists displaying in foreign capitals
their opposition to U.S. policies. Logan Act sabre-rattling has reap-
peared during almost every period of foreign policy controversy over the
past two centuries. 62 Indeed, the lack of a judicial test has, paradoxi-
cally, preserved the Act as a latent weapon for use in chilling, or at least
impugning, displays of dissent.
The incident which occasioned the statute's enactment indicates, if
anything, how little the issues have changed in the course of two centu-
ries. The late 1790s were marked by rising tensions between the U.S.
Administration and a revolutionary government in France that had,
among other things, taken captive American merchant ships and seamen
and scandalously attempted to extort tribute from a U.S. diplomatic dele-
gation (the so-called "XYZ affair"). 63 As the possibility of war loomed
on the horizon, the governing Federalists put pressure upon the French
and upon domestic Republican oppositionists, whom the Federalists reg-
ularly accused of collaborating with the enemy. 64 Among the results
were the notorious Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which authorized
summary arrest and deportation of "dangerous" aliens and punished the
authors of writings which defamed the U.S. Government.65
The deteriorating situation prompted a prominent Republican and
Quaker, Dr. George Logan of Philadelphia, to journey to France to meet
with the revolutionary leadership. Logan pointedly disavowed any effort
to negotiate on behalf of the United States. Rather, his objective was to
inform the French leadership of views being expressed in the U.S. and to
suggest mutually beneficial measures that might defuse the crisis. 66 Per-
haps sensing that a gesture to Logan afforded the opportunity to avert
confrontation while avoiding the appearance of capitulation, the French
responded by releasing U.S. captives and taking other conciliatory ac-
tion.67  The Federalists were far from grateful. Whether because
61. Kevin M. Kearney, Comment, Private Citizens in Foreign Affairs: A Constitutional
Analysis, 36 EMORY L.J. 285, 287, 303 (1987). See also Vagts, supra note 10, at 268; Smith,
supra note 59 (commenting that "constitutional lawyers say [the Logan Act] has not been
enforced for at least a century").
62. See generally Kearney, supra note 61, at 303-06; Vagts, supra note 10, at 270-80.
63. See Kearney, supra note 61, at 289-90.
64. See id. at 290 (citing characterizations of the Jeffersonian Republicans as "revolution-
ary Jacobins treasonably allied with the foreign enemy to overthrow the Constitution and cut
the throats of true Americans").
65. Id. at 289-92.




France's use of Logan's mission as a face-saving device vitiated an antici-
pated international vindication of U.S. might and resolution,6 or because
the mission's apparent success was politically beneficial to the Republi-
cans,69 the Adams Administration initiated legislation to prevent any
repetition of such independent diplomacy.70
From the Jeffersonian Republicans' point of view, the legislation
was, at best, a solution in search of a problem, 71 and at worst, a dema-
gogic effort by the governing party to incite fear of, and to justify repres-
sion against, the domestic opposition.72 Moreover, the Republicans
argued, the statute was "drawn in the loosest possible manner; and wants
that precision and correctness which ought always to characterize a pe-
nal law."'73 The Republicans nonetheless did not repeal the Logan Act74
when they became the ruling party, and, like numerous subsequent ruling
factions, they themselves invoked the Logan Act rhetorically.75
The history of the Logan Act has been marked by sound and fury,
but no actual enforcement.76 The only indictment ever issued under the
Logan Act occurred, oddly enough, in response to an 1803 newspaper
article (apparently, an "indirect" communication with a foreign govern-
ment) proposing the creation of an independent nation in the American
West, allied to France.77 The prosecution was pursued no further.78
During the Civil War, a federal judge in Massachusetts issued a grand
jury charge calling attention to a British parliamentarian's declaration
"that he had received many letters from the Northern states of America,
urging Parliament to acknowledge the independence of the Southern
68. Logan was criticized for "proclaiming to the enemy the division of [his] country."
Kearney, supra note 61, at 296 (quoting 5 ANNALS OF CONG., 2500 (1798)).
69. President Adams characterized Logan's goal as "to do or obtain something which
might give opportunity for the 'true American character to blaze forth in the approaching
elections.' " Id. at 295 n.59.
70. Id. at 294-95.
71. As one Republican legislator put it, an individual citizen has no reason to "be
ashamed or afraid to promote the peace of his country." Kearney, supra note 61, at 296.
72. According to Republican Albert Gallatin, "It was only by raising such a clamour in
the country as this, that they could hope to get such measures as the alien and sedition laws
approved by the people of the United States, or to believe that a standing army was necessary,
not to repel an invasion, but, as it is now confessed, for the crushing of a faction at home." 5
ANNALS OF CONG. 2514 (1798).
73. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2637 (1798) (statement of Albert Gallatin).
74. Unlike the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Logan Act had no expiration date. See Kear-
ney, supra note 61, at 302.
75. See Vagts, supra note 10, at 271-72. One instance under the Jeffersonians involved a
group of lawyers who provided the Spanish Government with an opinion on international law,
relevant to ongoing U.S.-Spanish negotiations, that was at variance with the U.S. position. A
Senate committee recommended prosecution, but nothing came of the incident.
76. See Kearney, supra note 61 and accompanying text.
77. See Vagts, supra note 10, at 271.
78. Id.
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Confederacy." '79 The court instructed that "if any such communication
had been made by a citizen of the United States, it is a high misde-
meanor."' 0 However, no indictments were issued.
Nonetheless, a 1964 federal district court opined in a private civil
action indirectly implicating the Logan Act that there is "no merit in
[the] argument that the Logan Act has been abrogated by desuetude." 8
Quoting Shakespeare, the court maintained that "[tihe law hath not been
dead, though it hath slept."82 The court did, however, call attention to
"the existence of a doubtful question with regard to the constitutionality
of the statute under the Sixth Amendment"8 " because of the vagueness of
the terms "defeat" and "measures." 4 The court "invite[d] Congres-
sional attention to the possible need for amendment" of the Act to rem-
edy this deficiency, 5 and noted that, in the meantime, any "ambiguity
should be resolved in favor of lenity."8 6 On the summary judgment mo-
tion before it, the court held that United States policy on importation of
Iranian oil in 1952 had not been "clearly and unequivocally deline-
ated," 7 raising "an issue of material fact as to the existence and identity
of 'the measures of the United States' " that plaintiff was alleged to have
intended to defeat by its communications with the Iranian authorities.88
Constitutionality concerns have apparently helped to deter annoyed
administrations from pursuing Logan Act prosecutions against opposi-
tionists who have carried on public discourse with adverse governments
abroad. In 1967, President Johnson was reportedly intent on a Logan
Act prosecution of radical civil rights leader Stokely Carmichael, who
had travelled to Hanoi and denounced the Administration's Vietnam
War policy. 9 When Attorney General Ramsey Clark protested that the
prosecution would be unconstitutional, Johnson turned to the State De-
79. Charge to Grand Jury - Treason & Privacy, 30 F. Cas. 1049, 1051 (C.C.D.Mass.
1861) (No. 18,277).
80. Id.
81. Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72, 89 n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
82. Id. (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 2).
83. Id. at 89. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
84. Waldron, 231 F. Supp. at 89 ("Neither of these words is an abstraction of common
certainty or possesses a definite statutory or judicial definition.").
85. Id. at 89 n.30.
86. Id. (quoting Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955)).
87. Waldron, 231 F. Supp. at 88.
88. Id. at 88-89.
89. Lewin, supra note 59, at 17.
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partment's legal staff to develop a basis for prosecution.' The author of
the resulting proposal later characterized his theories as "acceptable but
shaky," adding that "in retrospect, it is clear now that it would have been
foolish and unsound prosecutorial policy to have filed criminal charges
against Carmichael."9 Against the President's strong wishes, Attorney
General Clark refused to go forward. Ironically, that resolute stance set
an internal precedent that probably helped to protect Clark himself from
prosecution when he infuriated the Carter Administration by travelling
to Tehran to discuss the hostage crisis in 1980.92
Another Logan Act prosecution was threatened but not pursued
when the Reverend Jesse Jackson travelled to Cuba and Nicaragua in
1984, returning with 26 released Cuban political prisoners.93 Tellingly,
no mention of the Logan Act had been made previously when Jackson
had travelled to Syria and obtained the release of Lieutenant Robert
Goodman.94 The difference was that the earlier Jackson trip, by provid-
ing the Syrian leadership with an opportunity to release the captured
American military flier without appearing to capitulate, had extricated
the Reagan Administration from an embarrassing deadlock. In contrast,
that Administration had had no interest in the results of the Cuba trip,
however tangible its benefits and speculative its costs. 95 In any event, an
Administration official was quoted as saying privately, "I don't think
you'd find any government lawyer who would want to stand up in court
and try to make a case that Jackson has violated the law. "96
Nonetheless, the Logan Act looms. The most recent judicial refer-
ence to the Act appears in the dissent to a 1980 District of Columbia
Circuit decision that ordered restoration of the passport of Philip Agee, a
former CIA agent who was notorious for divulging the identities of CIA
agents working covertly abroad.97 Judge MacKinnon's dissent cited with
approval a draft of a Logan Act indictment against Agee regarding the
latter's December 1979 communications with Iranians who were respon-
sible for the takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran and the hold-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 17-18.
93. Smith, supra note 59.
94. Daniel Schribman, Jackson Pressing Syrian Trip Plans, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29, 1983, at
AlO.
95. The New York Times, while opposing prosecution, echoed the Administration's atti-
tude by quoting with approval the words of a released Cuban poet: "To go to Cuba to join in a
moral offensive with Fidel Castro is more than morally offensive, it is a moral offense." Mr.
Jackson's Prisoner Dealing, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1984, at A22.
96. Smith, supra note 59 (referring to how Jackson's actions have complicated American
diplomacy).
97. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting), rev'd
sub nom. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
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ing of fifty-three American hostages.9" The draft indictment charged
that Agee had violated the Act by "counselling, and suggesting to" the
hostage-takers
that they could prevail in their unlawful demands... by forc-
ing the United States ... by extortion, to deliver into [their]
possession... all records of the [CIA] on CIA intelligence op-
erations in Iran for the past 30 years, in return for the release
by said Iranian Terrorists of upwards of 50 citizens . . . then
being threatened with execution and being unlawfully held
"499
The indictment was never actually procured.
Agee's provocative stance and the criminality inherent in the actions
of those with whom he communicated may tend to obscure the sweeping
implications of the interpretation of the law as embodied in the draft
indictment. First, it is clear beyond cavil that Agee was not purporting
in these discussions to represent the United States, nor to represent any
political formation capable of imminently coming to power in the United
States. " The oft-cited concern about the nation "speaking with one
voice'" 0 1 is not seriously implicated by the actions of an isolated inter-
meddler. Second, the draft indictment does not indicate that Agee of-
fered the Iranians anything of value so as to "influence" them under a
restrictive interpretation of that term."°2 He is alleged to have "influ-
enced" the Iranians, if at all, by "counselling" or "suggesting" a course
of action-in other words, by sharing ideas with a foreign government. 103
Arguably, he could as easily have accomplished this goal by publishing
an opinion article in a United States newspaper. Third, the contention
that Agee intended "to defeat the measures of the United States" is not
98. Agee, 629 F.2d at 113 n. 70 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
99. Id. The hostage takers were deemed to constitute a foreign government as defined by
18 U.S.C. § 11 (1988). The term "foreign government," under the statute, "includes any gov-
ernment, faction, or body of insurgents within a country with which the United States is at
peace, irrespective of recognition by the United States."
100. Such a misrepresentation would, in any event, be prohibited by a separate statute
which contains none of the vagueness or overbreadth problems presented by the Logan Act.
See 18 U.S.C. § 954 (1988) (false statements influencing foreign government).
101. See, e.g., Vagts, supra note 10, at 269 (citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242
(1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). See also 106 CONG. REC. 8625-26 (1960) (statement of
Senator Fulbright regarding Logan Act).
102. It is not inconceivable that the indictment could have charged something much nar-
rower and more compelling. Agee was quoted in The New York Times as having told the
Iranians that he would "not become involved in identifying CIA personnel or in analyzing
documents until after all the hostages [were] released." Agee, 629 F.2d at 112 n.68. This can
be interpreted as offering the Iranians a specialized quid pro quo (very different from mere
favorable mention or political support), something the U.S. Government arguably has a com-
pelling interest in preventing. The draft indictment, however, made no reference to this
statement.
103. Agee, 629 F.2d at 113 n.70.
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tied to any enumerated "measures." The phrase "measures of the United
States" must thus be understood in some broader sense. Yet Agee was
plausibly attempting not to defeat the nation's measures, but rather, to
serve the nation's purposes by effecting a quick release of the hostages at
an acceptable cost. If the meaning of "intent to defeat the measures" is
neither enumerated nor obvious, it risks being manipulable.
Although foreign policy activists are rarely as provocative as Philip
Agee, many regularly communicate with representatives of foreign gov-
ernments with which the United States Administration is engaged in dis-
putes. For such activists, the draft indictment brandished against Agee is
a chilling reminder of their vulnerability to Logan Act prosecution. It is
not unusual to "counsel" or make "suggestions" to representatives of a
foreign government in the hope of influencing that government's conduct
vis-a-vis disputes with the United States. It is even possible that an ac-
tivist might suggest strategies for outflanking United States policymak-
ers, whose positions the activist might reasonably regard as
obstructionist and inconsistent with our nation's true interests and moral
standards." The Logan Act raises the prospect that mere contribution
of ideas constitutes an indictable offense, especially where their persua-
sive power might tend to frustrate policies being pursued at any given
moment by U.S. officials, whether or not those policies are enumerated in
authoritative policy statements.
C. Travel Restrictions
1. Passport Denial and Revocation
At least until recently, another potential weapon, complementary to
the Logan Act, for an administration seeking to clamp down on foreign
affairs activism abroad has been the denial or revocation of an activist's
passport. Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of State provide for
such denial where "[tjhe Secretary determines that the national's activi-
ties abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the na-
tional security or the foreign policy of the United States."' 0 5 Unlike the
Logan Act, passport revocation regulations have actually been enforced,
prompting the Supreme Court to pass on the regulations in Haig v.
104. It is possible that in the 1980s, some activists advised representatives of the Nicara-
guan Government not to make certain concessions to the Reagan Administration, on the the-
ory that the Administration would only be encouraged to "up the ante" and avoid resolution
of the conflict. Unquestionably, activists communicated to the Nicaraguans a variety of views
regarding specific Administration demands.
105. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(bX4) (1993) (emphasis added) (passport may be denied by Secre-
tary of State). See also 22 C.F.R. § 51.72(a) (1993) (a passport may be revoked when the
national would not be entitled to issuance of a new passport under § 51.70).
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The Agee decision turned on the existence vel non of an implied dele-
gation of Congressional authority to the Executive to promulgate such
regulations.'07 The Court held that Congressional acquiescence in a sub-
stantial and consistent administrative policy articulation, even without
acquiescence in actual administrative enforcement, was sufficient to es-
tablish the existence of a delegation. 08 Yet the separation-of-powers as-
pect of the case, while significant, is hardly the most interesting or
consequential problem raised by the regulations. Dwelling on Agee's
propensity to divulge sensitive information regarding CIA activities and
operatives, the Court glossed over, sidestepped, or completely ignored
each of the serious First Amendment problems that appear on the face of
the regulations. 'I
First, the Court began its truncated First Amendment discussion
with the words, "[a]ssuming, arguendo, that First Amendment protec-
tions reach beyond our national boundaries .... "110 It thereby refused to
commit itself to the principle that the First Amendment protects Ameri-
cans wishing to speak abroad from censorship by their own govern-
ment.I" (This refusal perhaps indicates that the Logan Act has more
vitality than even its protagonists have imagined.)
Second, whatever the implication from the Court's noncommittal
stance on the threshold issue, there can be little question that the Court
substantively diluted any First Amendment protection by characterizing
the passport revocation-justified on the basis of what Agee might say
abroad-as "an inhibition of action [i.e., of foreign travel], rather than
speech.""' 2 The Court elaborated that "Agee is as free to criticize the
United States Government as he was when he held a passport"' 13-a
106. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
107. Id
108. Id at 306. What the Court actually said was: "[We hold that the policy announced
in the challenged regulations is 'sufficiently substantial' and consistent to compel the conclu-
sion that Congress has approved it." Id. (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965)).
109. Agee, 453 U.S. at 308.
110. Id.
111. This issue is distinguishable from whether a person's liberty to travel may constitu-
tionally be deprived on the basis of that person's views or organizational affiliations. See
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 511 (1964) (holding that the challenged statute,
§ 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, unconstitutionally "establishes an irrebut-
table presumption that individuals who are members of specified organizations will, if given
passports, engage in activities inimical to the security of the United States").
112. Agee, 453 U.S. at 309 (quoting Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16-17). This characterization is
based on a similar but distinct point made in Zemel to the effect that a ban on travel to Cuba is
"an inhibition of action" not speech. Id That ban, however, did not openly discriminate
against individuals based on their expression, and was not openly intended to prevent speech
abroad.
113. Agee, 453 U.S. at 309.
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point that one would have imagined to be beneath refutation, since the
same could cynically be said of one imprisoned for political speech. 14
This language, on its face, implies that the Court did not rule that Agee's
First Amendment interest in making statements abroad was outweighed
by national security considerations, but rather that Agee had no such
First Amendment interest.
Third, the Court held "that since Agee's conduct falls within the
core of the regulation, Agee lacks standing to contend that the regulation
is vague and overbroad. '""5 Whatever the procedural merits of this
holding, its consequence was to leave the door open to passport revoca-
tion wherever the Secretary of State determines that the holder's "activi-
ties abroad ... are likely to cause serious damage" either to the national
security or to United States foreign policy." 6 It is far from clear that an
ordinary citizen wishing to retain the liberty to travel abroad, by reading
this regulation, has "a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohib-
ited, so he may act accordingly.""' 7 Since the delegation of Congres-
sional power was founded on the basis of acquiescence in the consistent
articulation (rather than in the consistent enforcement) of the standards,
a broad application would seem unlikely to be struck down as beyond the
scope of Congress's implicit delegation.
Finally, while recognizing that Agee had a due process interest in
the liberty to travel abroad, the Court denied the necessity of a prerevo-
cation hearing: "The Constitution's due process guarantees call for no
more than what has been accorded here: a statement of reasons and an
opportunity for a prompt postrevocation hearing."118 In a footnote, the
Court expressly left open the question of whether even these are constitu-
tionally required.' ' Assuming that some hearing is required, the Court
did not indicate what substantive standard might govern the proceedings.
The regulations appear to leave the determination of "likelihood to cause
serious damage" to the sole discretion of the Secretary of State. The
Court's disposition to review the reasonableness of such a determination
may plausibly be gauged by its observation that "matters relating 'to the
conduct of foreign relations ... are so exclusively entrusted to the polit-
ical branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial in-
114. "After all, the individual would remain free to criticize the United States Govern-
ment, albeit from a jail cell." Agee, 453 U.S. at 320 n. 10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. Agee, 453 U.S. at 309 n.61 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755-56 (1974)).
Justice Brennan vigorously dissented from this rendition of the standing doctrine. Agee, 453
U.S. at 321 n.10 (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972)).
116. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1993).
117. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
118. Agee, 453 U.S. at 310.
119. Id. at 310 n.62.
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quiry or interference.' ""20
In 1991, in a direct, if delayed, reaction to the breadth of executive
and judicial pronouncements in Agee, Congress specified impermissible
bases for the exercise of the State Department's authority to deny, revoke
or restrict passports: these include "any speech, activity, belief, affilia-
tion, or membership, within or outside the United States, which, if held
or conducted within the United States, would be protected by the [F]irst
[A]mendment. . "..", Although administrative regulations still permit
passport denial and revocation where "the Secretary determines that the
national's activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious dam-
age to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States,"'' 22
the new statute, in the words of the House Report, "clarifies that...
[F]irst [A]mendment activities alone do not constitute serious damage to
the national security or foreign policy of the United States.
1 ,23
The new statute has yet to be subjected to judicial interpretation.
Although the statutory language and the legislative report might seem
sufficiently straightforward to put the matter to rest,124 the effectiveness
of the new legislation rests on the judiciary's determination of what activ-
ities, "if held or conducted within the United States, would be protected
by the [F]irst [A]mendment," i.e., of what constitute "[F]irst
[A]mendment activities alone." A court of the Agee mindset may see
speech running afoul of FARA or the Logan Act, for example, as falling
outside of First Amendment protections; it may also defer readily to any
allegation by the Secretary of non-protected acts, without requiring proof
of their occurrence or persuasive arguments as to their significance.
25
Viewed optimistically, the new legislation on passport denial and revoca-
tion removes from the Executive one means of restricting the liberty of
foreign affairs activists to travel abroad. Yet the Executive has at its dis-
120. Id. at 292 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)).
121. 22 U.S.C. § 2721 (1992).
122. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1993) (denial); 22 C.F.R. § 51.72(a) (1993) (revocation).
123. H.R. REP. No. 53 and H.R. CONF. REP. No. 138, supra note 7, reprinted in 1991
U.S.S.C.A.N. at 401-02. The House Report made express reference to Agee in explaining the
need to "clarify" Congressional intent. H.R. REP. No. 53, supra note 7, reprinted in 1991
U.S.S.C.A.N. at 401-02.
124. The legislative history unmistakably supports a civil libertarian interpretation. The
House Report evinces disapproval of repeated Executive attempts to find bases for restricting
travel: "Despite the fact that Congress has repeatedly and consistently acted to facilitate the
international freedom of movement, the executive branch has repeatedly frustrated this policy
by limiting it administratively ... and even asserts the authority to deny, revoke, and restrict
passports on the basis of speech." Id.
125. As an example of just this kind of judicial deference, see infra note 143 and accom-
panying text, for a discussion of the ruling in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972),
which permitted the Secretary to exclude foreign visitors merely by giving a "facially legiti-
mate reason."
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posal a more sweeping power by which it can accomplish a similar end:
restrictions on all travel by U.S. nationals to specified countries.
2. Geographic Restrictions
The Executive has from time to time used a variety of devices to bar
travel to a handful of countries considered adverse to the United States.
Originally, this was done through the restriction of the validity of pass-
ports to exclude certain countries, and later has been accomplished by
way of economic measures under the Trading with the Enemies Act' 26
and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.127
The Supreme Court upheld Executive action of this type in Zemel v.
Rusk, 2 ' a 1965 case involving a ban on travel to Cuba effectuated
through the restriction of passport validity. 129 Zemel challenged the ban
as "a direct interference with the First Amendment rights of citizens to
travel abroad so that they might acquaint themselves at first hand with
the effects abroad of our Government's policies, foreign and domestic,
and with the conditions abroad which might affect such policies." 130 The
Court conceded that concern for the free flow of information underlies
the constitutional protection of foreign travel as a liberty interest under
the Due Process Clause, but denied that the travel ban's "inhibition of
action" constituted a First Amendment issue.' 31 "The right to speak and
publish," held the Court, "does not carry with it the unrestrained right to
gather information."'
13 2
The Zemel Court thus did not bother to justify the restriction as
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. It did point out that "in
the early days of the Castro regime, United States citizens were arrested
and imprisoned without charges,"' 33 and found the Secretary of State to
have "justifiably concluded that travel to Cuba by American citizens
might involve the Nation in dangerous international incidents."' 34 The
Court has since characterized the Zemel holding as "merely an example
of [the] classical deference to the political branches in matters of foreign
126. 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1988).
127. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1988).
128. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
129. A similar ban on travel to Cuba is currently in effect as part of the economic em-
bargo against Cuba, and has similarly been upheld as falling within the statutory authority and
the Constitution. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (Four justices dissented, but solely
on statutory interpretation grounds).
130. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 15.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 17.
133. Id. at 15.
134. Id.
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policy"' 35 and has assigned no significance to the intervening diminution
of any risk of an international incident arising as a result of travel by U.S.
citizens to Cuba.' 36 The current ban is justified as a means of depriving
an adverse regime of hard currency that would be spent by U.S. travelers.
The current regulations allow for a number of exemptions, the very
narrowness of which conveys a certain hostility to private information
gathering. A "general license" is granted to U.S. Government officials,
persons with close relatives in Cuba, and "persons who are traveling for
the purpose of gathering news, making news or documentary films, en-
gaging in professional research, . . . or similar activities."' 37 "Profes-
sional research and similar activities" are elaborated and tightly
circumscribed; "[s]tudy visits to Cuba in connection with pre-college or
undergraduate college course work," "general study tours," "student
class field trips," and "research for personal satisfaction only" are
barred, as is engaging in any activities supplemental to professional re-
search "in excess of that consistent with a full work schedule.'" 38 Only
"full-time professionals" doing research "specifically related to Cuba"
with "a substantial likelihood of dissemination of the product of such
research" are eligible.' 39 Because the penalty for "willful" violation is up
to ten years in prison and a $100,000 fine, '40 uncertainty as to the author-
itative interpretation might chill even a bona fide professional researcher.
Travel restrictions of this nature provide the Executive with a great
opportunity to limit the sources of information on a subject of U.S. for-
eign policy, precluding a grassroots educational campaign of the sort un-
dertaken by thousands of U.S. travelers returning from Nicaragua in the
1980s. They also give an Administration an opportunity to prevent the
type of international activism that took place in Nicaragua, such as
human rights monitoring of the war zones undertaken by the Witness for
Peace organization, or provision of skills and material aid undertaken by
a plethora of groups seeking to help Nicaraguans endure the U.S. eco-
nomic embargo and the U.S.-sponsored counterrevolutionary insur-
gency. It is, indeed, surprising that the Reagan Administration did not
135. Regan, 468 U.S. at 242.
136. Id.
137. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(1) (1993).
138. 31 C.F.R. § 515.416(a)(2), (b) (1993).
139. 31 C.F.R. § 515.416(a)(1) (1993). The provision governing "specific licenses," how-
ever, has recently been broadened to authorize their issuance, "in appropriate cases," for
"clearly defined educational or religious activities, for activities of recognized human rights
organizations ... or for purposes related to the export, import, or transmission of information
or informational materials." 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(b) (1993), 58 Fed. Reg. 34,711 (June 29,
1993). It is unclear what cases will be deemed "appropriate."
140. 31 C.F.R. § 515.701 (1993). See also 31 C.F.R. § 515.417(b), (c) (1993), 58 Fed.
Reg. 34,710 (June 29, 1993).
[Vol. 2:255
employ such a device with respect to Nicaragua; its failure to do so seems
to have been the result of political, rather than legal, considerations.
D. Exclusion of Foreign Political Figures
For those who cannot gain direct access to foreign viewpoints by
travelling abroad on a regular basis, visits to the United States by foreign
political figures provide an important source of timely information on
foreign policy issues. Foreign officials are uniquely situated to respond to
the U.S. media's reporting of often-unanswered charges against their
governments. They, as well as non-official foreigners active in politics,
can explain a point of view that may be systematically ignored or dispar-
aged in American political discourse. Yet precisely because such persons
are "going over the head" of the Administration to make their case to the
American people, the Executive has often had occasion to exercise its
sweeping visa powers to exclude foreign political figures. Recent reforms
have eliminated the patently offensive "ideological exclusions" from the
enabling statute,1 41 but continue to vest in the Executive considerable
leeway to exclude purveyors of unwelcome expression.
Under the former statutory scheme, a would-be foreign visitor who
advocated revolutionary or Communist ideas or was an affiliate of a
Communist-oriented organization, or whose presence in the United
States was viewed by a consular official as "prejudicial to the public inter-
est," fell into a category of excludable aliens and had to seek from the
Secretary of State a discretionary waiver of excludability.142 In Klein-
dienst v. Mandel,'43 where citizens wishing to meet and exchange views
with a visitor challenged the waiver denial on First Amendment grounds,
the Supreme Court held that
when the Executive exercises [the power to deny a waiver] on
the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts
will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test
it by balancing its justification against the [conceded] First
Amendment interests of those who seek personal communica-
tion with the applicant.1"
The Court expressly declined to reach the question of whether, in the
absence of any proffered justification, the denial was subject to attack on
141. 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(3)(D) (1993) limits the long-standing discrimination against
members of "totalitarian" parties to immigrant aliens rather than visitors.
142. Former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27)-(28), (d)(3) (1988).
143. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
144. Id. at 770. The Court failed to explain how courts can determine whether the prof-
fered reason is bona fide if they do not look behind it. The proffered reason in Mandel, as the
dissents pointed out, was not well substantiated; Mandel had previously violated visa condi-
tions of which he had apparently not been informed, and the violation had consisted of speak-
ing at too many universities. Id. at 773-74 n.4 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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First Amendment or other grounds. In practice, waivers were often
denied. 145
As of 1990, amendments have restructured the statutory scheme
governing excludability of foreign visitors, abolishing ideological exclu-
sion but retaining exclusions relating to foreign policy and terrorism.
The reform in this area has been markedly less sweeping than that under-
taken with respect to passport revocation; whereas the latter sought to
eliminate Executive actions based on expression, association or belief, the
new alien exclusion statute continues to allow exclusion on these bases.
The foreign policy exclusion applies where the Secretary has "rea-
sonable ground to believe" that the alien's entry or proposed activities
"would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences."' 46
The alien's "past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associa-
tions," if they would be lawful within the United States, cannot be the
sole basis for excluding foreign officials or political candidates, and can-
not be the basis for the exclusion of other aliens "unless the Secretary of
State personally determines that the alien's admission would compromise
a compelling United States foreign policy"' 47 and notifies Congressional
committees accordingly. The section leaves unclear, if not confused, the
extent to which the courts may second-guess the Secretary's judgment;
"reasonableness" appears as a standard in assessing "potentially serious
foreign policy consequences"1 48 where advocacy and association are not
cited as the sole grounds for exclusion, but no such standard is men-
tioned with respect to the Secretary's certified personal judgment of a
compelling interest where advocacy and association are so cited. 9
The terrorism exclusion appears tightly drawn to limit coverage to
anticipated or past direct involvement in violent activity,' 50 but does
leave room for questionable exclusions. First, the exclusion applies to an
alien who "has engaged in a terrorist activity" without regard to the pe-
145. The 1977 McGovern Amendment mildly reformed the exclusion provisions to re-
quire, consistent with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, that an alien not be excluded solely on
the basis of organizational membership or affiliation unless the Secretary certified to Congress
that admission of the alien "would be contrary to the security interests of the United States."
Pub. L. No. 95-105, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. (91 Stat.) 848. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d
1043, 1053-60 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affid mem. 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (3-3 decision), appeal after rem.
sub nom. City of New York v. Baker, 878 F.2d 507 reh'g denied, 888 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir.
1989). This Amendment itself became riddled with exceptions. See former 22 U.S.C.
§ 2691(b) (non-application to representatives of state-controlled labor organizations), (c) (non-
application to the Palestine Liberation Organization), and (d) (non-application where alien's
country not in substantial compliance with Helsinki Final Act) (repealed 1990).
146. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C)(i) (1993).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 8 U.S.C. § l182(a)(3)(C)(iii) (1993).
150. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (1993).
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riod of time in which the person was engaged in such activity. Former
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir is apparently excludable for his
activities in the 1940s. "" Second, although the elaborations of "affording
material support to any individual, organization, or government in con-
ducting a terrorist activity" seem not to include routine association with
an organization involved in armed civil conflict, it is not clear how the
relevant clauses will be interpreted. 152 Third, the statute eliminates the
necessity of proving engagement in terrorist activities vis-a-vis one organ-
ization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). As the statute
states, "An alien who is an officer, official, representative, or spokesman
of the Palestine Liberation Organization is considered, for purposes of
this chapter, to be engaged in a terrorist activity." '53 This irrebuttable
presumption calls into question the drafters' seriousness about eradicat-
ing exclusions based on advocacy and association.
154
The extent to which the restructuring of the exclusion statute will
151. See generally Jackson Diehl, Israel's Shamir Riding Seesaw of Change, WASH. POST,
Oct. 26, 1991, at A3; Glenn Frankel, Israel's Plucky Politician: Once an Outcast, Shamir Gains
Wide Appeal, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1988, at Al. See also A. PERLMUTrER, ISRAEL, THE
PARTITIONED STATE 80-89 (1985) (describing Jewish underground military groups in
Palestine).
152. "Affording material support" includes providing funds "to any individual the actor
knows or has reason to believe has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity," and
soliciting "any individual for membership in a terrorist organization [or] terrorist govern-
ment." 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iii) (1993). "Terrorist government" and "terrorist organiza-
tion" are undefined; if they refer to any government or organization, any part of which has
ever engaged in terrorism, then a great many governments and national liberation movements
are included (as the U.S. itself would be).
According to press reports, the Immigration and Naturalization Service has taken the
position in a pending case that the statute authorizes deportation of resident aliens who raised
funds for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, even if that fundraising supported
only the organization's non-violent activities. Sixty professors of immigration law have report-
edly protested to the Attorney General, pointing out that this interpretation contradicts the
statutory language. Anthony Lewis, Cause for Justice, N.Y. TIMEs, September 20, 1993, at
A13.
153. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) (1993).
154. The denial of a waiver for a PLO official under the prior statutory scheme was chal-
lenged in Harvard Law Sch. Forum v. Shultz, 633 F. Supp. 525 (D. Mass. 1986), vac'd on
ground of mootness, 852 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1986). The State Department had denied permis-
sion for the PLO's Permanent Observer to the United Nations to travel to Massachusetts
(outside the zone delimited to accommodate his UN activities) to publicly debate a well-known
advocate of the Israeli cause. The Secretary, having previously granted the PLO official travel
permission for vacations and other personal activities, justified the denial on the ground that
the official's participation in a debate with American citizens would undermine the U.S. policy
of denying legitimacy to the PLO. The district court held that this justification, being "di-
rectly related to the suppression of a political debate with American citizens," failed the Klein-
dienst v. Mandel test of facial legitimacy in light of First Amendment considerations. Schultz,
633 F. Supp. at 531. (The district court granted a preliminary injunction, which was stayed by
the First Circuit; the case subsequently became moot without any further opinion issuing.)
In the wake of the recent Israel-PLO peace accords, it is anticipated that the current
statute will be modified to ease or eliminate discrimination against the PLO.
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effectively operate to prevent the Executive from impeding Americans'
access to foreign political figures remains to be seen. The recent amend-
ments were more an attempt to purge the exclusion statute of McCarthy-
ite prejudice (notwithstanding the continuing restriction on immigration
by current or recent members of Communist organizations) than an ef-
fort to protect from zealous defenders of the foreign policy status quo the
First Amendment interests championed by the dissenting justices in
Kleindienst."' It is only by interpreting the statute with full regard for
First Amendment concerns that the court will be able to protect the free
flow of information from Executive efforts to exclude dissonant voices.
In summary, the current pattern of legislation and regulation in the
foreign affairs realm suggests no less than four areas where the constitu-
tional values taken for granted in domestic discourse are compromised:
the Foreign Agents Registration Act; the Logan Act; travel restrictions;
and exclusion of foreign political figures. To promote democratic deci-
sionmaking and popular participation in the foreign affairs realm, the law
in these areas must be "domesticated"-that is, must be brought into
conformity with the constitutional principles prevalent in the domestic
realm. This can be done without compromising any of the vital interests
that the offending legislation and regulation purport to uphold.
III. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
The past two years have seen two significant steps toward eliminat-
ing the anomalous deprecation of First Amendment liberty in the foreign
affairs realm. The first, as discussed above, was the 1991 passage of legis-
lation eliminating the Executive's authority to deny or revoke passports
on the basis of speech, association or belief.'56 Much better than the
1990 reform to the alien exclusion statute, the new passport revocation
section, amplified by its accompanying House Report, straightforwardly
embodies the premise that the First Amendment is fully operative in the
foreign affairs realm. What remains is for this principle to be generalized
to all statutory and regulatory schemes affecting citizen participation in
foreign affairs.
The second step occurred in 1992 when, after a fifteen-year delay,
the Senate gave its advice and consent to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (International Covenant),' 57 which contains
155. 408 U.S. 753, 770-74 (1992) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Id. at 774-85 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
156. 22 U.S.C. § 2721 (1992).
157. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
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expansive language regarding freedom of expression across national
boundaries. Although non-self-executing, the Covenant commits the
United States to eliminating the present impediments to the interactions
of politically active Americans with foreigners.
Article 19(2) of the Covenant provides as follows: "Everyone shall
have the right to freedom of expression: this right shall include freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice." '  None of these freedoms is
absolute. The Covenant, like First Amendment jurisprudence, places re-
strictions on these freedoms, but "only. . . such as are... necessary" to
protect "the rights or reputations of others," "national security," "public
order," and "public health and morals."15 9
At least in the realm of domestic affairs, U.S. courts apply strict
scrutiny to serve the precise purposes set forth in Article 19.16' Despite
the use of such a standard, the "regardless of frontiers" requirement goes
largely unfulfilled. This is the result of a deferential judicial attitude re-
garding foreign affairs that fails to take account of the contemporary re-
quirements of citizen participation. To satisfy Article 19, as well as to
serve the fundamental purposes of the First Amendment, the governmen-
tal power unleashed by this judicial deference must be "domesticated."
Only in this way can the fundamental purposes of the First Amendment
be served.
In Haig v. Agee the Supreme Court reiterated the principle, enunci-
ated in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, that "the conduct of foreign relations,
the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government
are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to
be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference."'' That the
Court should favorably recall Harisiades, a 1952 decision upholding the
deportation of resident aliens whose only fault had been prior member-
ship in the Communist Party at a time when such membership had been
lawful and unregulated, casts a pall over the prospects for judicial protec-
tion of First Amendment rights in the foreign affairs realm. "Certainly
158. Id. at 178 (emphasis added). Article 20 qualifies Article 19 by barring "propaganda
for war" and "advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence." Id.
159. Id., art. 19(3), 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
160. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The Court declared that "only a
compelling [governmental] interest in the regulation of a subject within [governmental] consti-
tutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 438. Accord
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 112 S. Ct. 2583 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New
York Crime Victims Board, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Arkan-
sas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
161. Agee, 453 U.S. at 292 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)).
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no responsible American," opined the Harisiades Court, "would say that
there were [in 1940] or are now no possible grounds on which Congress
might believe that Communists in our midst are inimical to our secur-
ity.9 '62 In Harisiades, First Amendment concerns did not suffice to
heighten the level of scrutiny, in part because advocacy of change "by
force and violence" did not, under the jurisprudence of that era, consti-
tute protected expression.1
63
Although there is no indication that the Agee Court intended, by its
Harisiades reference, to turn back the clock on First Amendment law to
pre-Brandenburg standards, 4 it did intend to reassert a deference to the
political branches 65 that has severe First Amendment consequences.
Those consequences arise out of a confusion over what can constitute a
compelling, or even legitimate, foreign policy interest in limiting speech
or speech-related conduct.
The political branches of government have a cognizable interest in
precluding interference with the conduct offoreign policy, but not in pre-
cluding interference with the perpetuation of foreign policies. Under a
democratic system of government, neither the Executive nor Congress is
privileged to take measures (other than rebuttal) to prevent the Ameri-
can public from being persuaded that current policies are unwise or un-
just, no matter how convinced those branches may be of the importance
of those policies to national interests or national security. Our Constitu-
tion does not envisage a "protected democracy," a la Pinochet, in which
the citizenry is saved from the consequences of its own "irresponsibility."
Neither does the Constitution envisage a form of "democratic central-
ism," a la Lenin, in which dissenters from decisions taken internally are
forbidden to seek to frustrate those decisions by appealing, through rea-
son and persuasion, to outsiders (or by undertaking humanitarian efforts
to undo harms to foreign civilians).' 66 Adherence to our principles of
freedom, it should be added, serves the broader goals of foreign policy;
international trust in the United States, its citizens, and its values is
greatly enhanced to the extent America's power is tempered by accounta-
162. Id. at 590 (emphasis added).
163. Id.
164. Compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (advocacy may be forbid-
den only where "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and ... likely to
incite or produce such action), with Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 512 (1951) (uphold-
ing conviction for conspiracy "to advocate and teach the duty and necessity" of violent
revolution).
165. Agee, 453 U.S. at 292.
166. It is instructive to note the insistence of Art. III, Sec. 3, that "Treason against the
United States shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies,
giving them Aid and Comfort." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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bility to an informed citizenry, and to the extent its citizens freely and
independently participate in problem-solving efforts worldwide.
The Government has the power to preclude verbal acts that, by their
direct effect, obstruct it in the conduct of foreign policy. As the Supreme
Court noted in the landmark case of Near v. Minnesota, "No one would
question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its
recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or
the number and location of troops."' 67 These acts do not have their ef-
fect by informing public debate or persuading persons to oppose policies;
they obstruct the Government's conduct of foreign policy by the mere
fact of their occurrence, not by their influences on opinion. The Bran-
denburg standard is based on the same concept: advocacy can be banned
only where it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless ac-
tion"-not where it might rationally persuade persons of the merits of
lawless action, but only where its inflammatory nature and context risk
triggering lawlessness in advance of any rational reflection.' 6 Similarly,
freedom of expression is not a license-whether in the foreign affairs or
domestic realm-to engage in extortion, bribery or fraud, since these ver-
bal acts form no part of reasoned discourse or democratic participation.
The Government has no overriding interest, however, in preventing
the nature of its activities from being exposed, debated, and contradicted,
whether at home or abroad, even if such exposure, debate or contradic-
tion threatens to render established policies untenable. Thus, as Con-
gress has acknowledged in its recent passport legislation, one cannot
accept then-Solicitor General McCree's suggestion during the Agee oral
argument that the Secretary of State could properly determine travel to
El Salvador for the purpose of denouncing U.S. policies to constitute
''causing ... serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy
of the United States" so as to justify passport revocation.' 69 Freedom
and democracy will almost inevitably "cause damage" to meticulous pol-
icy designs devised from above, but our constitutional system was not
intended to shield policies from opposition.
Nor does it make sense to limit the right of opposition to the domes-
tic realm in this era of participation by independent experts, dissidents,
and NGO's from around the world in the international discourse on
human rights, disarmament, and environmental policy. The Constitu-
tion empowers policymakers temporarily to speak for the nation, but it
expressly and in unconditional terms reserves to individuals the right to
167. 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
168. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
169. See Agee, 453 U.S. at 319 n.9.
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speak for themselves. 7 '
It follows that there should be no prohibition, such as that in the
Logan Act, against citizen communications with foreign governments in-
tended to influence those governments' conduct toward the U.S., or even
intended "to defeat the measures of the United States," so long as those
communications merely convey the information, ideas, and opinions that
all Americans are indefeasibly privileged to express.' Often, communi-
cating with foreign leaders is a form of participation in domestic politics,
for the international political arena is indivisible; when a George Logan
or a Jesse Jackson, by meeting with an officially-disfavored foreign
leader, cause the foreign government to appear in a light that undermines
support among Americans for a U.S. policy of confrontation, he works to
"defeat the measures" (or machinations) of U.S. policymakers in just the
manner that constitutional democracy, by its essence, makes available.
Even where this is not the case, however, the possibility that an officially-
disfavored foreign leader may benefit at the expense of U.S. policy by
receiving the views of individual Americans does not justify the Govern-
ment in imposing what amounts (in this, the information age) to an em-
bargo on political ideas-a notion which is, in any event, so ludicrously
impractical as to lack a rational basis.'72 Philip Agee's suggestion to the
Iranians that they trade hostages for intelligence information might not
have been a welcome addition to the ideas in play during that interna-
tional incident, but attempting to bar the flow of such ideas is not a suffi-
ciently sensible policy to justify restricting free expression.
Not all circumstances, of course, are unambiguous. Agee's cam-
paign to expose CIA activities in foreign countries entailed disclosure of
information informative to democratic discourse, both in the U.S. and
abroad. The secret placement of CIA operatives in certain positions
abroad raises troubling issues regarding American values and the integ-
rity of foreign political systems. These deceptive practices may contami-
nate our own political process, as when an ostensibly independent
Nicaraguan opposition leader, later revealed to have been on the CIA
170. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech ..... U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
171. Efforts by states such as South Africa (in regard to advocacy of divestiture) and
Israel (in regard to meetings with PLO officials) to limit the speech or associations of their
nationals abroad are hardly models of effective policy, let alone models compatible with U.S.
constitutional traditions. One could well imagine the reaction if a Chinese dissident, having
met with U.S. officials, were to be prosecuted in China for attempting thereby "to defeat the
[repressive] measures" of China.
172. Obviously, such an embargo would also directly violate the guarantee of "freedom to
... impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers" under Article 19(2) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
178.
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payroll, testified before Congress in 1985 to urge certain policies toward
that country. Disclosure of the nature of these practices is thus, by the
criteria indicated above, expression worthy of protection,'73 yet even dis-
closure of the specifics of a policy in progress may at times be the only
method of usefully informing public debate on an issue of general con-
cern. The problem is that while the former permissibly interferes with
the perpetuation of controversial policies, the latter-whatever its value
to democratic discourse-also interferes with the conduct of policy by
operating directly, without mediation by political processes, to defeat the
policy. When the verbal act of one person defeats the policy of duly
authorized officials, it is hardly clear that democracy is served; on the
other hand, covert policies are arrived at undemocratically, and tend to
violate international law as well as the law of foreign countries (including
democracies).
The clear case occurs where the verbal act is likely to result directly
in the deaths of CIA operatives, prevention of which is a compelling in-
terest of the Government. 74 It is this circumstance that Justice Brennan
addressed in reasserting the time-honored standard in his Haig v. Agee
dissent: "Only when there is proof that the activity 'must inevitably, di-
rectly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to im-
periling the safety of a transport already at sea' does the Near exception
apply."' 75 In this circumstance, the compelling interest in barring the
"verbal act" aspect of the expression outweighs the right to engage in the
informative and persuasive aspect. It is only where actions have irre-
trievably been taken and lives lie in the balance that expression of revela-
tions pertinent to public discourse can be unequivocally deemed an
inferior value.
The Government also has a compelling interest in precluding actual
interference in negotiations. Given the tremendous weight of the U.S. in
world affairs, it would rarely, if ever, be possible for an actor subject to
U.S. jurisdiction to bid against the Administration in negotiations with a
foreign nation. An illustrative scenario is provided by the alleged "Octo-
ber Surprise" conspiracy, in which officials of the 1980 Reagan Presiden-
tial Campaign were said to have induced the Iranians to withhold the
release of U.S. hostages until after the U.S. elections, in return for
promises of arms from the prospective Administration. Such activity
173. I will not grapple here with the complicated question of the violation by a CIA
renegade of a contractual obligation of confidentiality. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
507 (1980).
174. The Court in Agee made reference to some evidence that Agee's disclosures had
resulted in violence against CIA operatives. 453 U.S. at 286-87 n.7.
175. Id. at 320-21 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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would genuinely constitute what might otherwise appear an oxymoron-
unauthorized negotiation on behalf of the United States. Such expression
seeks not to inform or persuade, but to bribe or extort, and deserves no
First Amendment protection.
Consistent application of First Amendment principles further re-
quires that the American citizenry not be denied access to foreign polit-
ical figures who seek to visit the United States where the Administration
claims that "adverse foreign policy consequences," however "potentially
serious," will arise from political speech. The newly amended exclusion
statute is obscure on this point, permitting an alien's "past, current, or
expected beliefs, statements, or associations" to be a partial (but not
"sole") basis for the exclusion of foreign officials and political candidates,
and a partial or sole basis for the exclusion of other aliens where the
Secretary certifies that "admission would compromise a compelling
United States foreign policy." '176 It is difficult to understand how an
alien's presence could, by virtue of his "past, current, or expected beliefs,
statements or associations," actually "compromise a compelling United
States foreign policy." '77 The statute leaves open the use of exclusion to
foreclose a political debate that could not possibly interfere with the con-
duct of foreign policy, but might simply interfere with the designs of
policymakers to perpetuate their policies without opposition.
A federal district judge once eloquently disposed of this problem as
follows:
It may well be that the public interest will, in some respect, be
adversely affected by affording a forum to a PLO representative
whose policies are in conflict with those of the United States
and indeed are anathema to many citizens. The public interest
in preserving free and open debate on precisely such subjects,
however, must be regarded as of overwhelming priority, as
mandated by the First Amendment, and as being at the heart of
our survival as a free people.
1 78
That judgment did not stand, but should have. It acquires additional
force with our nation's recent pledge, through ratification of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to ensure "freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers."' 79 Indeed, judicial vigilance must extend beyond those cases
where suppression of debate is the avowed purpose; strict scrutiny should
be applied wherever the effect of governmental action is to deny the right
176. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C) (1993).
177. Involvement in terrorist or Nazi activities, the two obvious bases for important sym-
bolic stances, are covered elsewhere in the section. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1993).
178. Harvard Law School Forum v. Shultz, 633 F. Supp. at 531-32 (Skinner, J.).
179. International Covenant, supra note 157, art. 19(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
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to receive information from foreign sources.
180
Reasonable minds may differ as to whether steadfastness in the ex-
pression of moral revulsion constitutes a compelling interest justifying
exclusion of speakers (possibly including such independently significant
personages as Austria's Kurt Waldheim and such multifaceted figures as
Cambodia's Hun Sen) on the basis of their direct participation in geno-
cide or Nazi persecutions.' 8 1 The same can be said regarding exclusion
of speakers who have been directly engaged in terrorist activities,' 82
though one does well to remember the bromide that yesterday's terrorist
is tomorrow's statesman: the passage of time and the intervening ac-
cumulation of more legitimate actions clearly renders the interest less
compelling (as in the case of Yitzhak Shamir's Stern Gang activities in
the 1940s"8 3). The exclusion statute's irrebuttable presumption against
PLO representatives clearly fails the test; so does any diplomatic "cold
shoulder" policy, since the Administration has at its disposal the less
drastic means of refusing to meet with disagreeable foreigners.
The same strict scrutiny should apply to travel restrictions. As Jus-
tice Douglas noted in his dissent in Zemel v. Rusk, "The right to know,
to converse with others, to consult with them, to observe social, physical,
political and other phenomena abroad as well as at home gives meaning
and substance to freedom of expression and freedom of the press."'8 4
Thus, "[r]estrictions on the right to travel in times of peace should be so
particularized that a First Amendment right is not precluded unless
some clear countervailing national interest stands in the way of its
assertion." 8 5
The current restrictions on travel to Cuba, unlike those dealt with in
Zemel, are based on the goal of depriving Cuba of hard currency that
American travelers would spend there. Whether or not this goal can be
deemed compelling, the current regulations at the very least evince an
inappropriate hostility to travel for educational purposes. A "general li-
cense" is granted for officials, journalists, professional researchers, and
those travelling to visit close relatives. 8 6 The existence of the license
seems to confirm what may otherwise be intuited: that the policy is suffi-
ciently served if mass tourism, engaged in for relaxation or general
amusement, is precluded. Such preclusion is itself a burden on the right
180. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1965) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (applying the "compelling governmental interest" test to interference with the right to
receive information from abroad).
181. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E) (1993).
182. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (1993).
183. See supra note 150.
184. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 23 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
185. Id at 26.
186. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a) (1992).
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to receive ideas and information as an incidental benefit of vacationing in
a foreign land, but this burden is arguably de minimis. The same cannot
be said of the express preclusion of "[s]tudy visits to Cuba in connection
with pre-college or undergraduate college course work, .... general study
tours," "student class field trips," and "research for personal satisfaction
only.""8 7 Such activities go to the heart of the First Amendment interest,
whereas it is the additional hard currency at stake that is arguably de
minimis. Courts must strictly scrutinize travel restrictions to remedy all
such unnecessary constriction of the foreign policy debate.
Finally, strict scrutiny must be applied to the Foreign Agents Regis-
tration Act. Although FARA does not directly bar expression, its cur-
rent interpretation-calling for registration wherever the totality of
circumstances implicates "the informative purposes of the Act"-sub-
stantially burdens freedom of association and the free flow of information
and ideas across frontiers by: (1) exposing activists associating with for-
eign political figures to expansive inquiries regarding their communica-
tions and activities, (2) attaching a deliberately stigmatizing label to
activists who are associated with, but not under the control of, foreign
entities, and (3) barring expression by persons who refuse to concede
what they in good conscience believe to be false and defamatory.
The Supreme Court has on several occasions recognized the inhibi-
tory effect of governmental information-gathering on association and ad-
vocacy. 18 8 As Justice Frankfurter noted in his concurrence in Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, where the petitioner refused to answer inquiries regard-
ing his political party and regarding the content of an academic lecture:
For a citizen to be made to forego even a part of so basic a
liberty as his political autonomy, the subordinating interest of
the State must be compelling .... [The] inviolability of privacy
belonging to a citizen's political loyalties has so overwhelming
an importance to the well-being of our kind of society that it
cannot be constitutionally encroached upon on the basis of so
meagre a countervailing interest of the State as may argumenta-
tively be found in the remote, shadowy threat to the security of
New Hampshire allegedly presented [by Sweezy's relationship
187. 31 C.F.R. § 515.416 (1993). But see 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(b) (1993) (recently
amended to authorize issuance of "specific licenses" for educational purposes in "appropriate
cases").
188. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (corporate registration statute's rou-
tine demand for membership lists held unconstitutional where disclosure "may induce mem-
bers to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of
exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences of this
[exposure]"); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (investigation of
Communist infiltration insufficient to justify compelled disclosure of NAACP's membership
and contributor lists).
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to the Progressive Party]."8 9
The concerns at stake often weigh more heavily in the cross-border con-
text, where both Americans and foreigners exposed in the inquiry may
operate under adverse conditions abroad, without recourse to legal pro-
tections taken for granted in the United States.
Under FARA an activist or activist group, operating independently
from but in voluntary coordination with a foreign group, may be barred
from conveying beliefs or information unless it first accepts the stigma-
tizing label of "foreign agent." The Court recognized the First Amend-
ment consequences of stigmatization in Lamont v. Postmaster General of
the United States.'9° In that case, the post office had sought to block
delivery of what it deemed "communist political propaganda" from
abroad, absent the addressee's express written indication of a desire to
receive such mail. The Court held as follows:
The addressee carries an affirmative obligation which we do not
think the Government may impose on him. This requirement
is almost certain to have a deterrent effect, especially as respects
those who have sensitive positions. Their livelihood may be de-
pendent on a security clearance. Public officials, like school-
teachers who have no tenure, might think they would invite
disaster if they read what the Federal Government says con-
tains the seeds of treason. Apart from them, any addressee is
likely to feel some inhibition in sending for literature which fed-
eral officials have condemned as "communist political propa-
ganda." The regime of this Act is at war with.. ."uninhibited,
robust and wide-open" debate and discussion . ...
Although the Court somehow managed to find in Meese v. Keene that the
Act's use of the term "propaganda" to characterize foreign-government-
distributed documentaries was technically "neutral" and thereby consti-
tutionally inoffensive,' 92 it is inconceivable that the application of the
term "foreign agent" to one not under the control of a foreign entity can
be so found, even by use of the most sterile semanticism.
It is predictable that, should FARA ever be enforced as broadly as
the INAC decision permits, many individuals and groups subject to the
Act will, as a matter of principle, refuse to register. Their continuing
activities would then be criminally punishable. Such a result would eas-
ily be recognizable as repressive if it were to befall an organization
abroad friendly to and engaged in consultation with the U.S.
189. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
190. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
191. Id. at 307.
192. 481 U.S. 465, 477-85 (1987).
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Government.' 93
Whatever may be the compelling interest underlying application of a
registration and disclosure regime to individuals and organizations
whose activities are controlled by foreign entities, it is difficult to imagine
the compelling interest justifying extension of that regime to others, un-
less one improperly admits perpetuation of foreign policies as a compel-
ling interest. The fact that American activists may be in sympathy and
close contact with a disfavored foreign government or organization does
not justify limiting their First Amendment rights on foreign policy
grounds.
Application of First Amendment strict scrutiny to laws restrictive of
participatory rights in the foreign affairs realm brings about a "domesti-
cation" of these laws, thereby bringing the U.S. into compliance with
international law standards that are, in actuality, based on an American
conception of free expression. Complying with Article 19 of the Interna-
tional Covenant requires nothing more or less than facing up to our own
constitutional values, which, when reflected back at us in this way, illu-
minate the shortcomings of our own constitutional practice. By imple-
menting the words, "regardless of frontiers," constitutional
jurisprudence can eradicate the infringements inherent in each of the re-
strictive laws pertaining to foreign affairs.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the domestic affairs realm, it is taken for granted that searching
judicial review is required to protect the exercise of constitutionally-guar-
anteed rights from the potentially partisan and anti-democratic designs
of a ruling faction. Yet, in the foreign affairs realm, zealous judicial de-
fense of individual rights, and of the democratic process that could not
exist without them, has at times given way to an uncharacteristic trust in
paternal and omniscient governmental officials. Persons acting with the
governmental imprimatur are presumed to be acting in the interest of the
nation as a whole, and the matters to which they address themselves are
deemed too complex and demanding of special knowledge for the very
courts that have designed sweeping school desegregation plans and
passed on the constitutionality of the most technical economic
regulation.
In reality, official conduct of foreign affairs is as likely to be perme-
ated by a partisan spirit as is the framing of domestic policy, and the
193. In the 1980s, organizations operating more or less freely within Nicaragua often
engaged in activities "requested" by the U.S. Government. Had the Nicaraguan Government
sought to compel them to register as U.S. agents, their heroic refusal and ensuing unjust im-
prisonment would undoubtedly have made them a cause celebre in the United States.
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complexity of foreign affairs issues is as varied as that of domestic issues.
Officials often pursue foreign policies that are viewed by significant sec-
tors of public opinion as completely contrary to the enlightened interests
and values of our nation, and when given a free hand, such officials may
be mightily tempted to hamstring their opponents by enacting measures
aimed at limiting democratic discourse. Unless their power is "domesti-
cated," and the democratic process enabled to check their actions, the
potential for foreign policy disaster abounds.

